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Equality is . . . the leading feature of the United States. . . [T]hat vastextent of unpeopled territory which opens to the frugal and industrious a
sure road to competency and independence will effectually prevent for a
considerable time the increase of the poor or the discontented, and be the
means of preserving that equality of condition which so eminently distin-
guishes us.1
Two hundred years ago the framers of the United States Constitu-
tion considered the relative equality of "citizens" 2 to be a great
source of national strength. Those who had visited England and
France were conscious of the extremes in wealth and poverty that
characterized those countries.' They apparently shared the confi-
dence expressed by Charles Pinkney that availability of open land
would sustain the equality which was the bedrock of their
democracy.4
In less than one hundred years some of the early assumptions of
equality gave way. The institution of slavery became, as Gouverneur
Morris predicted at the Constitutional Convention, "the curse of
* Professor of Law, Washburn University of Topeka. B.A. 1970, Oberlin College;
J.D. 1975, University of California, Berkeley. The author acknowledges the contributions
of Professor Liaquat Ali Khan, Ms. Connie Sue Hamilton, Professor Richard D.
Schwartz and Professor Samuel J.M. Donnelly.
I. J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
184 (A. Koch ed. 1966) (quoting Charles Pinkney).
2. 1 use the term "citizens" to distinguish the attitude towards slaves, which was
based on assumptions of inequality that cannot be reconciled with the rosy picture ofequality painted by Mr. Pinkney, who was one of the South Carolina representatives at
the Constitutional Convention. See id.
3. See F. MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM, THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS
OF THE CONSTITUTION 93 (1985).
4. See J. MADISON, supra note I.
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heaven on the states where it prevailed."' 5 While the principle of
equal protection became explicitly incorporated into the Constitu-
tion, the nineteenth century conception of equality still did not ad-
dress the sphere of public welfare benefits.
Although equality has been a consistent theme in American con-
stitutional history, neither the participants in the Constitutional Con-
vention nor the authors of the Civil War Amendments were asked to
consider a conception of equality which constrained government dis-
tribution of basic goods and services. Once it is understood, however,
that historical thinking about equality was grounded on assumptions
about the ability to move west and become a farmer, then it is possi-
ble to ask about the implications of a change in those underlying
assumptions.
The welfare state is a twentieth century phenomenon that necessi-
tates new thinking about the meaning of equal protection. Through-
out this century, however, the United States Supreme Court has
been preoccuppied with concerns about "substantive due process."
'
In recent decades the Court has been guided by principles developed
to protect state and federal legislation from efforts to "constitution-
alize" a laissez-faire economy. The fear of using the Constitution to
"embody a particular economic theory" 8 has led both commentators
and the Court to avoid legal principles which reflect concern for po-
tential welfare recipients.
Judicial intervention to protect welfare interests has been under-
standably limited. Prevailing wisdom built upon an assumption that
"classifications bearing on nonconstitutional interests - even those
involving 'the most basic economic needs of impoverished human be-
ings,' - generally are not subject to special treatment under the
Equal Protection Clause; they are not distinguishable in any relevant
way from other regulations in 'the area of economics and social wel-
fare.' " But there is a clash between the spirit of equality and an
approach which purports to place "legislative classifications imping-
ing upon . . . survival on the same plane as a refusal to let a
merchant hawk his wares on a particular street corner."
10 As Justice
Blackmun wrote: "Only a pedant would insist that there are no
5. Id. at 411.
6. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
7. Id. at 75. As noted by Justice Holmes in dissent, Lochner was "decided upon
an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain. . . . The Four-
teenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statistics. . . . [A] con-
stitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism
and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire." Id.
8. Id.
9. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 232 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)).
10. Lyng v. Castillo, 106 S. Ct. 2727, 2732 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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meaningful distinctions among the multitude of social and political
interests regulated by the [states].""
The challenge is to identify coherent principles which enable the
justices to make the "relevant" distinctions they seek. Early formula-
tions of a "right" to welfare benefits were too controversial to be
accepted by a Supreme Court majority.12 Furthermore, the need for
government flexibility is real enough to make the courts appropri-
ately wary of creating constitutional straight jackets. Therefore, it is
important now to identify an alternative approach that recognizes
both the government interests and the individual needs that are at
stake, an approach that resolves the tension' 3 between "mere ration-
ality" and "welfare rights."
This Article proposes a principle of equal protection based on a
"fair distribution" of basic government services and benefits to those
with "brutal needs." The first section identifies the theoretical per-
spectives of constitutional interpretation that influenced the analysis.
The second section examines historical developments that have cre-
ated the need to revise conceptions about the constitutional treat-
ment of welfare assistance. Part three reviews doctrinal arguments
that demonstrate the efforts and frustrations in articulating accept-
able standards for Supreme Court review of these questions. In the
final section, the theoretical framework is applied in an effort to re-
solve the doctrinal problems encountered by the Court.
11. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 233 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added). This
line from Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Plyler immediately followed his cau-
tionary note that the Court must base its decisions on "relevant" distinctions. See supra
note 9.
12. See Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Forward: On Protecting
the Poor through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969) [hereinafter
Michelman, Supreme Court]. As John Hart Ely notes, "the retreat from the once glit-
tering crusade to extend special constitutional protection to the poor has turned into a
rout." J. ELY, DEMOCRACV AND DISTRUST 148 (1980). Nevertheless, efforts to revive the
theory that welfare benefits warrant special constitutional protection continue. See, e.g.,
Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659
(1979) [hereinafter Michelman, Welfare Rights]; Tribe, Unraveling National League of
Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services,
90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977); Nelson, Wealth Classifications and Equal Protection
Quo Vadimus?, 19 Hous. L. REV. 713 (1982); Antieau, The Jurisprudence of Interests
and Adjudication of Equal Protection Controversies, 57 U. DEr. J. URB. L. 831 (1980).
13. Professors Laurence Tribe and Frank Michelman refer to the tension within
the "rhetoric, reasoning, and results" of Supreme Court opinions. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1074 (1978); Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 12, at 664.
In this article I am addressing the tension between those Supreme Court opinions and a"strong" theory of welfare rights.
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This Article has not been written with specific cases or legislation
in mind,14 and I do not intend to advocate a particular result in an
individual pending case. Instead, I am concerned with outlining an
approach to judicial review of basic government assistance to the
poor. This approach builds on a combination of concern for moral
values, an understanding of the relationship between legal and social
values in a dynamic-society, and the appropriate constraints of legal
principles.
The values underlying this analysis are based upon the importance
of "primary social goods" for the "least advantaged."' 5 This empha-
sis was derived from the moral philosophers, especially from the
Rawlsian interpretation of justice as fairness, and his ethics of mu-
tual respect. 16 Assuring minimum basic goods becomes an element of
respect owed to all individuals in a just society." The value of equal-
ity is understood in terms of "minimum welfare"' 8 rather than as a
broader egalitarian concept.
While it is tempting to begin with this value and to convert it into
a claimed right of minimum welfare, problems remain in efforts to
link this theoretical standard with constitutional doctrine. Although
claims have been made that this basic principle has survived judicial
scrutiny,' 9 there is still a gap between the "strong right" articulated
and the tenuous language of the Court.20 As a result, it is appropri-
ate to search for theoretical support in less absolute terms.
An alternative approach appears in the description of pragmatic
instrumentalism 21 which links classical figures such as Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes, Jr., Roscoe Pound, Jerome Frank and Karl Llewellyn
14. For an article which addresses the question of the specific cases involved in
this analysis, see Note, Intermediate Equal Protection Scrutiny of Welfare Laws that
Deny Subsistence, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1547 (1984). The case most carefully analyzed in
that article was Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1983), which upheld the Pennsylva-
nia category of "transitionally needy." The Court of Appeals in that case had expressed
"considerable doubt" about the traditional rational basis doctrine of the Supreme Court,
but nevertheless felt constrained to apply that standard and to uphold the legislative
classification. Id. at 96. The student comment which addressed that case advocated use
of heightened equal protection scrutiny in a manner generally consistent with the theory
developed in this paper. See Note, supra note 14.
15. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 90-95 (1971). See also Michelman,
Supreme Court, supra note 12; Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare
Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 962 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter Michelman, Pursuit]; Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 12.
16. See J. RAWLS, supra note 15, at 251-57. Rawls, in turn, traces the roots of his
analysis to Immanuel Kant.
17. Id.
18. Michelman, Supreme Court, supra note 12, at 9.
19. Id. at 663.
20. See, e.g., infra text following note 168.
21. R. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982).
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into what has been described as the "dominant theory of law in
America during the middle decades of this century."22 Elements of
pragmatic instrumentalism include an empirical emphasis and a fo-
cus on "law as a means to goals"2 of realizing prevailing "wants
and interests."2 4 While avoiding some of the excesses of the instru-
mentalists,25 especially their occasional insistence on strict, quantita-
tive, utilitarian analysis, 6 I accept their willingness to evaluate law
in relationship to social goals. This emphasis, in turn, accepts the
significance of social change as a basis for reevaluating an interpre-
tation of law. "The instrumentalists . . . viewed preexisting law as
less than all-encompassing and social change as a major stimulus to
legal change . . . . [O]ccasions to modify old law and to make
wholly new law arise from the dynamism of society. 2 7 It is that
element of the pragmatic instrumentalist tradition that I will call
upon for a re-evaluation of constitutional analysis in the welfare
context.
In addition to accepting the empirical and pragmatic aspects of
American jurisprudence, I also accept the emphasis that has been
placed on the democratic process as a primary basis for constitu-
tional analysis.28 Two factors traditionally have been cited as guides
to the exercise of judicial authority: 1) courts should apply close
scrutiny when reviewing legislation that impinges upon the demo-
cratic process; and 2) courts should protect "discrete and insular mi-
norities" from discrimination by the majority.2 9 These principles can
be brought to bear separately on the basic needs issue: One can focus
on the need for education, food, health or access to the courts as a
prerequisite to political participation; or one can focus on the poor
(or sub-groups within the poor) as minorities in need of protection
from majoritarian politics.
The second of these two approaches has attracted critical com-
mentary. John Hart Ely, for instance, would treat racial discrimina-
tion differently from discrimination against the poor by distinguish-
22. Id. at 26.
23. Id. at 78.
24. Id. at 43.
25. Id. at 50-54.
26. My willingness to combine references to Summers and Rawls should be un-
derstood to imply rejection of the strict utilitarian aspects of pragmatic instrumentalism.
27. R. SUMMERS, supra note 21, at 83-84.
28. See J. ELY, supra note 12.
29. Id. at 75-77. The primary source cited by Ely (and many others) for this
principle is footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938).
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ing "a sadistic desire to keep the miserable in their state of misery,
or a stereotypical generalization about their characteristics" (factors
which Ely associates with racial discrimination) from "insensitivity"
and "a reluctance to raise the taxes needed to support such expendi-
tures."'30 The example, however, illustrates the limits of a rigid, all-
or-nothing approach. The line between sadism and insensitivity is not
only hard to draw, it is also difficult to defend.3" If a minority group
(in this case the poor) is discriminated against in whole or in part
because of either the contempt or the indifference of the political
majority, then majoritarian democracy has failed to establish accept-
able standards of justice. This is especially true when, life and health
are at stake. (Was Marie Antoinette hostile or indifferent?) While
the protection afforded such a group may not be equivalent to that
offered traditional victims of hostile racism, the bright lines are
blurred, and at least some heightened scrutiny for such a group
should be recognized. 32
Another reason given for refusing to treat the poor as a discreet
and insular minority is the claim that "laws that actually classify on
the basis of wealth" are relatively rare.3 The focus of this analysis,
however, is not on discrimination that separates all of the poor for
hostile treatment. I am more concerned with classifications that,
whether generated from hostility or indifference, have the effect of
treating some of the poor differently from others in an unfair man-
ner. Thus, I am assuming some legislative commitment to provide
assistance, and I am concentrating on the fairness of the classifica-
tions created for the distribution of that aid.
The absence of bright lines to guide the Supreme Court gives rise
to the fundamental problem of accepting judicial protection in this
area. Judges are understandably reluctant to accept standards that
appear to support unbridled discretion. To control that tendency I
stress the importance of "principled analysis. ' 34 Discretion can be
30. J. ELY, supra note 12, at 162.
31. For a picture of the historical treatment of the poor as "moral pestilence", see
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). For an account of the link between racism
and poverty, see W. WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE (1978). As Wil-
son's statistics demonstrate, it is becoming increasingly apparent that traditional racial
discrimination still continues through the more palatable guise of discrimination against
the poor.
32. See Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 0HIO ST. LI. 131 (1981), for a
further critique of the classifications recognized by Ely.
33. J. ELY, supra note 12, at 162.
34. See R. DWORKIN. TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) [hereinafter R. DWOR-
KIN, RIGHTS]. Professor Dworkin's theory is offered as an antidote to the unguided judi-
cial discretion characterizing legal positivism, the most central and established legal the-
ory in the United States since 1950. Positivism as defined by Professor H.L.A. Hart was
based on the importance of determining the legitimacy of constitutional or legislative
acts, and required adherence to those sources of law if promulgated and applied in a
manner consistent with due process. Professor Hart, as a proponent of legal positivism,
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controlled through a demand that judges maintain coherence in the
development of legal principles on which their decisions are based.
Implied in this analysis is the distinction Ronald Dworkin makes
between "principles" and "policies." Principles are standards re-
quired as elements of justice or fairness and they are a part of the
body of law; policies generally reflect goals of improving the general
welfare. 35 Arguments developed in this Article are based on a search
for principles rather than on views about good social policy. While
policy arguments may be persuasive in a legislative arena, I will ac-
cept the claim that they should not form the sole basis of judicial
analysis.36 In resolving constitutional problems, social policy argu-
ments will be balanced on the side of the legislative judgment and
not as a basis for overturning a legislative act. This emphasis on
principles is intended to check the utilitarianism of the instrumental-
ists and to guide the analysis of democratic processes."
Legal principles are understood to change over time as a result of
change in the social or economic conditions on which prior law was
based.38 Intellectual honesty, however, requires that judges identify
such changes to ensure the coherence they seek between past and
present decisions.3 9 By extension, those who advocate particular reso-
lution of a legal problem are obligated to relate their arguments to
the established body of legal principles. Acceptance of those con-
straints is implied in the theoretical framework adopted in this
paper.
Several additional assumptions influence the scope of this analysis.
It is assumed that the fourteenth amendment is open-textured - its
meaning is not limited to the ideas or purposes which may have been
in the minds of those who drafted and ratified it in the 1860s.40 No
effort will be made to convince diehards committed to strict interpre-
recognized that in some circumstances legal terminology is unclear; in such circum-
stances he concluded that judicial discretion is appropriate. Professor Dworkin attempts
to narrow that sphere of discretion by arguing that a coherent pattern of legal principles
narrcwly constrains judicial decisionmaking. See also R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRIN-
CIPLE (1985) [hereinafter R. DWORKIN. PRINCIPLE].
35. R. DWORKIN: RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 22.
36. Id. at 82-84.
37. See R. DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 34, at 57-69. In other words, when
Ely and Dworkin part company, I tend to agree with Dworkin.
38. This understanding is central to the "pragmatic instrumentalism" that hascharacterized twentieth century American jurisprudence. See Summers, supra note 21.
It is also implicit in Dworkin's theory. See R. DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 34.
39. For a description of the tasks Dworkin prescribes for his Judge Hercules, see
R. DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 105-30.
40. See J. ELY, supra note 12, at 11-41.
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tivism that their arguments are wrong.41 I will generally describe,
however, social, economic and political changes that support reevalu-
ation of the relationship between federal, state and local govern-
ments and programs to meet minimum welfare needs of the popula-
tion. Changes of this nature are relevant (though not decisive) when
explaining changes in perspective regarding the meaning of the four-
teenth amendment.42 In that context I will not differentiate between
federal and state responsibilities, and I will assume that principles
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment also ap-
ply to the federal government.43 Arguments favoring an alternative,
stronger principle derived from state constitutional law will be noted
but not developed.44
When I use the term "principles" I am referring to them in the
constructive sense.45 They do not arise from a vision of natural law.
They instead are derived from analysis of the relationships, condi-
tions, and accepted assumptions of the society to which they are ap-
plied. In this same vein, I assume that Justices of the Supreme Court
should strive to apply a coherent pattern of principles in arriving at
judicial opinions.46
My focus will be on arguments of principle that support Supreme
Court protections against denial of fundamental benefits. This focus
assumes that certain goods and services provided by the government
can be described as fundamental. Health care, food, monetary assis-
tance, education, housing or legal assistance might be included in
such a definition.4 7 I do not mean to suggest that all components
41. For a historical analysis by Ely, see id. For a discussion of the "framers'
intent," see R. DWORKIN. PRINCIPLE, supra note 34, at 33-71.
42. This is not intended to imply freedom to pick and choose substantive princi-
ples for incorporation into the fourteenth amendment, but rather that the clauses of that
amendment are capable of growth (see J. ELY, supra note 12, at 30 n.69) and under-
standing basic social and economic changes in society will help explain that growth. A
specific example of this change is incorporated in Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.
J. 733 (1964) (cited in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970)).
43. Equal protection generally is considered implicit in the fifth amendment due
process clause. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); United States Dep't. of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
44. See infra note 199.
45. See R. DWORKIN. RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 159-68, for a distinction between
"constructive" and "natural" models.
46. See id. at 87 for Dworkin's rejection of "intuitionistic" theory. In rejecting
nihilist alternatives, I accept James Fishkin's statement that "[a] contested reasonable-
ness is quite different than an arbitrary whim." J. FISHKIN, JUSTICE. EQUAL OPPORTU-
NITY AND THE FAMILY 186 (1983). See also Rich, Reassessing Legal Realism: A Re-
sponse to Professor Nowak, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 429 (1983).
47. It is tempting to focus on "equal opportunity" and to attribute higher status
to education than to other goods or services linked to subsistence. The Court's recent
opinion in Plyler would lend credence to that approach; however, I would not accept that
distinction. As noted by Michelman: "Unaccompanied by subsistence or health or free-
dom from extreme environmental deprivation, how could educational offerings effectuate
fair equality of opportunity?" Michelman, Pursuit, supra note 15, at 989. Dworkin
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should be treated identically, or that the list is limited to this group.
When I refer to minimum protection against economic hazard, or to
basic public benefits, I have in mind goods and services of this
nature.
This analysis leads to a principle of fair distribution for those fun-
damental benefits intended to meet brutal needs of the poor. I will
explain why, as a result of social and structural changes in the ad-
ministration of government assistance, this principle warrants recog-
nition. I also intend to show that recognition of this principle is ap-
propriate in light of the doctrinal concerns of the Supreme Court as
well as general principles of constitutional jurisprudence.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The principle of equality was important to those who framed the
Constitution, but it was not explicitly incorporated until the four-
teenth amendment was adopted in 1868. Conceptions of the state's
role prevalent at that time had been shaped when industry was in
early stages of revolt."8 Although an industrial economy was emerg-
makes a similar point when he rejects definitions of equality based soley on "fraudulent"
equal opportunity concepts. "[M]arket allocations must be corrected in order to bring
some pecple closer to the share of resources they would have had but for these various
differences of initial advantage, luck, and inherent capacity." R. DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE,
supra note 34, at 207.
The key identifying factor is whether the individual will be unable to satisfy basic
needs that otherwise are provided by the government and are considered necessary for
participation in the political and economic life of the society. The term "brutal needs"
used as a reference to this standard first appeared in Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261. It is
symbolic of the broad range of basic needs discussed in this analysis.
I have included legal assistance in this list of basic needs, and in doing so, I reject
Winter's criticism of the concept of "just wants" which suggests that if the poor really
wanted legal counsel, "they will . . . purchase insurance against that risk" so that a"'rule' guaranteeing the right to counsel regardless of one's means can be disposed of as
superfluous." Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause,
1972 Sup. CT. REV. 41, 69. The argument demonstrates Winter's inability to compre-
hend the pressures of poverty. When faced with immediate demands to satisfy basic
wants, these demands will take precedence over aversion of risk; immediate needs will be
given greater attention than future potential needs. This does not mean, however, that
the reality of legal problems (or health care) are somehow important - only that insur-
ance is not of high enough importance for the individual who lacks adequate resouces to
satisfy all basic immediate wants. When viewed from a perspective of society as a whole,
however, legal needs and health care problems are constantly present (not just specula-
tive future problems). Therefore, it is appropriate to develop social insurance programs
which evaluate the relative importance of legal access or health care as if they were an
immediate problem (not merely speculative risks) and from that perspective allocations
to such programs would virtually always be given high relative priority.
48. See Woodard, Reality and Social Reform: The Transition from Laissez
Faire to the Welfare State, 72 YALE L.J. 286 (1962).
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ing, the majority of the population remained self-employed or en-
gaged in agricultural labor.49 Land remained accessible through the
westward expansion envisioned in 1787,50 offering at least a theoreti-
cal source of subsistence to anyone willing and able to make the
move and adopt the common profession of the people.
State obligations to assist those in need were matched with nine-
teenth century social, economic, and political assumptions. Local
governmental responsibility for public assistance had been assumed
for more than two centuries under the Statute of Elizabeth5" and its
colonial counterparts. 52 Identification of those in need, however, was
limited by the common perspective of that era. Because the United
States offered a uniquely broad level of resources for self-employ-
ment at a subsistence level, there was no question of need for those
capable of normal physical activity.3
The Protestant ethic predominated.5 4 Successful employment was
tantamount to moral worth, while financial failure was a sign of
moral weakness. Although by the middle of the nineteenth century
the strongest of these moralistic views of economic success or failure
were beginning to lose their grip, attitudes toward welfare assistance
remained persistently moralistic.55 Local welfare administators iden-
tified morally worthy recipients.58 Widows with infants were obvi-
ously deserving while able-bodied transients were not entitled to con-
sideration.5 7 Thus, a state obligation to provide public assistance was
understood and accepted as a local responsibility bounded by narrow
conceptions of the deserving poor.
Assumptions about who merits assistance and how it should be
administered have changed dramatically in the last one hundred
49. In 1870, 53% of the United States work force was engaged in agricultural
employment. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES COLONIAL TIMES TO 1975 at 134. In contrast, 2.8% of the United States
labor force was engaged in agricultural employment in 1980. BUREAU OF LABOR STATIS-
TICS. HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 54, 55 (1983).
50. See J. MADISON, supra note 1.
51. See 43 Eliz., ch. 2 (1601).
52. See Riesenfeld, The Formative Era of American Public Assistance Law, 43
CALIF. L. REV. 175 (1955).
53. Concern for the welfare of the general population still could be addressed
through the philosophy articulated by Thomas Jefferson: "Whenever there is in any
country, uncultivated lands and unemployed poor, it is clear that the laws of property
have been so far extended as to violate natural rights." PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
8:681-82, noted in R. MATTHEWS, THE RADICAL POLITICS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 27-28
(1984).
54. See A. LAFRANCE, WELFARE LAW: STRUCTURE AND ENTITLEMENT IN A NUT-
SHELL 1-13 (1979).
55. See Woodard, supra note 48, at 310.
56. Id. See also King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
57. See New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837). For identification of the transi-
tion in attitudes toward responsibility for care of transients, see Edwards v. California,
314 U.S. 160 (1941).
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years. This transformation was dictated by the evolving structure of
the economy described as a shift "from laissez faire to the welfare
state."5 8 Demographic changes meant that the majority of the popu-
lation was no longer tied to an agrarian base where individual labor
was the primary key to existence.5 9 Instead, changes affecting em-
ployment often resulted from institutional changes that the individ-
ual worker could not control.6 0 Calvin Woodard defined the welfare
state as the logical derivative of the proposition "that poverty is an
economic, not a moral phenomenon.""1 One of the implications of
this shift was that public welfare became recognized as a state and
federal, rather than local, responsibility.62 Election of Franklin
Roosevelt demonstrated an initial majority agreement that a federal
response to the depression was necessary.63 Subsequent support for
building the "great society" signaled a continuing commitment to
extend government support for basic minimum personal needs in
time of prosperity as well as depression.
Changes in reality do not necessarily provoke changes in perspec-
tive. While the myth that virtue will assure employment persists,
there is nevertheless a broadly based social and political recognition
of the government's obligation to meet basic needs. The acceptance
of a "safety net"64 by the conservative majority of the 1980s demon-
strates the endurance of the new principles of public support. In
comparison with the debate that characterized previous generations,
a political right to welfare protection can now be said to have
achieved acceptance. 5
The bureaucratic structure used to administer welfare services,
however, reflects a clear hierarchy in the level of political support
58. Woodard, supra note 48, at 323.
59. The percentage of the American work force employees in agriculture shifted
from 52% in 1870 to 4.7% in 1970. See UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HIS-
TORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TImES TO 1970, at 127 (Bicen-
tennial ed. 1975).
60. Woodard, supra note 48, at 322-323.
61. Id. at 311.
62. Id. See also A. LAFRANCE, supra note 54, at 6-12. In Edwards, 314 U.S. at
174, the Supreme Court noted that "in an industrial society the task of providing assis-
tance to the needy has ceased to be local in character."
63. See A. LAFRANCE, supra note 54, at 13.
64. During the early years of President Reagan's administration, a dispute arose
concerning the definition of the "safety net" needed to assure minimum subsistence. Im-
plicit in this debate was acceptance of the government's responsibility to meet these
needs. See President Reagan's State of the Union Address, 128 CONG. REC. H51, at 53
(daily ed. Jan. 26, 1982).
65. See id.
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and protection for different groups of potential welfare recipients.
The group on top, with strongest support, includes both the aged and
the disabled. 6 That group is protected by federal law and served by
the federal Social Security Administration.67 A second level of sup-
port is extended to dependent children in one parent families who
are assured assistance by the federal government, 8 but who depend
on the states to establish the level of their support and to administer
the programs.6" Closely related but just below this group are those
whom the states may, at their option, choose to include in the federal
assistance programs.70 At the bottom of the heap, the group most
likely to be treated with contempt by the legislatures (and who re-
ceive little if any federal support), are those in the "general assis-
tance" category who are left over from the other groups and who are
nevertheless in need of basic assistance.7 1 In Victorian terms, they
are not "morally worthy."
The separate treatment of the groups described above can be justi-
fied.7 2 Children do have different needs and interests than the dis-
abled. Furthermore, the interest in assuring that those capable of
work will have the incentive to do so is legitimate. While distinctions
between these groups may be rational or even reasonable, it is criti-
cally important to emphasize the differences in "acceptability" of the
various groups, and the likelihood that those on the bottom of the
hierarchy may be treated with indifference if not contempt. 3
The intended purpose in describing this historical and structural
overview is to underscore that the social and economic changes that
have occurred support an urgently needed reevaluation of applicable
legal principles. The judiciary has generally lagged behind other gov-
ernment institutions in accepting the consequences of social and po-
litical change. This slow response could be explained in terms of the
inherently conservative nature of the judicial branch.7 4 In the con-
66. These groups are defined in the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1382
(1985).
67. Supplemental Security Income, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1395w.
68. Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-676. Note that
the predecessor of this program restricted aid to "children of widows" since they were
the "morally worthy" recipients. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 320-21 (1968).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 602.
70. Id. § 607.
71. Cases from different jurisdictions illustrate the hostile treatment extended by
the states to all or part of this group. See Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1983);
New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973). See also Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
72. It is consistent with the principle of equality to increase awards for those who
work harder or make better choices in life. The question Dworkin poses is: "what reasons
for deviation are consistent with equal concern and respect?" See R. DwORKIN, PRINCI-
PLE, supra note 34, at 209.
73. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
74. See A. BICKEL. THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
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text of protection for the economic rights of the poor, however, addi-
tional reasons exist for slow judicial acceptance. Experience with
substantive due process created a reluctance to interfere with gov-
ernment regulations. 5 Furthermore, there was judicial acceptance of
the need for government flexibility in responding to economic
problems.76 As a result, a line was drawn between civil liberties that
permitted judicial intervention and economic classifications that paid
extreme deference to legislative decisions. 7 As the artificial nature
of this line became more obvious, the judiciary slowly accepted re-
sponsibility for assuring fundamental fairness in the government's
distribution of basic benefits.
7 18
SEARCH FOR LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Although scholars agree that there have been dramatic social, eco-
nomic and political changes since the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury, few accept those changes as an independent basis for new con-
stitutional standards.7 9 Their reluctance can be described in terms of
a distinction between "background rights" and "institutional
rights."80 As defined by Professor Dworkin, background rights "pro-
vide a justification for political decisions by society in the ab-
stract."' 81 Thus, rights to food, housing, health care or education sup-
port legislative action in those contexts. But identification of such
background rights in a political context does not establish legal, 2 let
alone constitutional, status for those claims.8 3 The jurisprudential de-
THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
75. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
76. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610 (1960) ("To engraft upon the
Social Security system a concept of 'accrued property rights' would deprive it of the
flexibility and boldness in adjustment to ever-changing conditions which it demands.").
77. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 530-531
(3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
78. See infra notes 79-152 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., the opinion for the Court of Justice Powell in San Antonio v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 31 (1973); see also R. DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 34.
80. See R. DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 93.
81. Id.
82. Two different principles of statutory construction are part of the backgrcund
of related legal principles. The first, which directs that relief and social welfare statutes
are to be "liberally construed," could be considered part of the background of related
legal principles. See 81 C.J.S. Social Security § 5 (1977); see, e.g., King v. Smith, 392
U.S. 309 (1968) and the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in that case, 392 U.S. at
334. Despite substantive parallels, however, this statutory principle cannot be tied di-
rectly to a constitutional standard.
83. For a more positive description of the role of background rights, see R.
DWORKIN. PRINCIPLE, supra note 34, at 17. In that paragraph Dworkin discusses the
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bate regarding welfare rights is appropriately directed to principles
which have been developed by the courts.
Underlying concern for fair treatment of recipients of government
aid has evolved slowly in interpretations of the open-textured due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
84
That evolution, however, has been anything but clear or consistent.
Dramatic declarations of rights for the poor have been countered by
retreats appearing to negate such theories. These inconsistencies can
be traced to strong disagreements within the Court and shifting pat-
terns of majority support. While it would strain credibility to argue
that a coherent pattern has emerged from this process, it neverthe-
less can be demonstrated that denial of fundamental public benefits
triggers careful review of government action by several Justices of
the Supreme Court. An overview of the case law documents those
developments.
Supreme Court Opinions
The Supreme Court of the 1950s was the product of political con-
cerns about judicial interference with the rights of both state and
federal governments to legislate on behalf of the general welfare.
Members had been chosen at least in part for their acceptance of the
government's new role and function, especially that arising from the
Social Security Act and other New Deal legislation.85 An underlying
assumption was that the legislature, as the progressive branch of
government, should be free from interference by the conservative ju-
diciary. This "progressive" background provided little encourage-
ment for those seeking judicial review of claims for aid from a reluc-
tant government.
In an early, hesitant opinion, the Supreme Court in Griffin v. Illi-
nois8" cited both the equal protection and due process clauses in re-
quiring Illinois to provide transcripts of criminal trials to indigent
defendants for appellate review.8 7 In a five to four decision, the
Court found that a state which grants appellate review cannot do so
"in a way that discriminates against some convicted defendants on
account of their poverty."88 The majority in Griffin rejected the the-
ory that the due process clause required state action on behalf of
effect of background rights as limits on inconsistent legal principles.
84. See J. ELY, supra note 12, at 14-32. Only the due process and equal protec-
tion clauses can be understood as having meaningful, substantive content despite Ely's
preference for privileges and immunities.
85. Justices Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas and Jackson all were appointed by
Franklin Roosevelt with an understanding that they would support his government's so-
cial legislation.
86. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
87. Id. at 18.
88. Id. at 18.
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indigent defendants. 89 The Court's delicate treatment of the due pro-
cess clause reflected special concern for substantive analysis, with all
of its historical baggage.
Four years later the Court faced its first major challenge by indi-
viduals excluded from Social Security protection. In Flemming v.
Nestor ° a majority again demonstrated its fear of imposing substan-
tive constraints on the legislature. In Flemming, Social Security ben-
efits had been terminated for an alien deported because of Commu-
nist Party membership between 1933 and 1939. In denying relief
under the due process clause of the fifth amendment, the Court held:
"To engraft upon the Social Security system a concept of 'accrued
property rights' would deprive it of the flexibility and boldness in
adjustments to everchanging conditions which it demands."'"
Subsequent cases marked the thrusts and parries that accompa-
nied the emerging case law. A hotly divided Court recognized proce-
dural safeguards when wages9 2 or welfare benefits9 3 were at stake.
The Court struggled to find appropriate boundaries for such protec-
tion: some Justices advocated extending the new due process theory
to every denial of government benefits,94 while others wanted to
abandon totally the effort to provide pre-termination constraints.95
Justice Powell established a middle ground by accepting the idea of
"flexible due process" which was satisfied by a post-termination
hearing to review termination of old age, survivors and disability in-
surance provided by Social Security.9"
Developments in procedural due process marked judicial recogni-
tion of "new property" in a welfare state.97 The Court's more sensi-
tive treatment of basic benefits illustrated concern for the "brutal
needs"98 of the recipients. The government faced a heavy burden in
89. Id. at 21. Justice Frankfurter concurred with the majority but refused to ac-
cept a rationale based on due process.
90. 363 U.S. 603 (1960). In interpreting the fifth amendment the Court noted
that "the Due Process Clause can be thought to interpose a bar only if the statute
manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification." Id.
at 611.
91. Id. at 610.
92. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
93. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
94. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 206 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972) (White, J., dissenting). Also,
note the fears of Justice Stewart in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 629
(1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
96. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 323 (1976).
97. See Reich, supra note 42.
98. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261.
justifying its inability to provide a pre-termination hearing in that
context.9 19 Procedural constraint in the context of brutal needs was
thus elevated to a principle with constitutional status.
By contrast, equal protection analysis (as well as substantive anal-
ysis of due process) has failed to generate comparable agreement on
a majority position. An early thrust came from Justice Brennan in
Shapiro v. Thompson.100 In that case, year-long residency require-
ments were linked to receipt of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC). In carving out a right to travel, the Court invali-
dated the welfare eligibility restrictions.' 0'
The parry came in two cases within the next three years. Dan-
dridge v. Williams"'0 upheld maximum AFDC limits for large fami-
lies, and Jefferson v. Hackney'0 3 allowed Texas to restrict AFDC
shelter allowances more than it restricted allowances for the aged or
disabled. It was during this period of frequent judicial review of
"Great Society" welfare regulations that scholars actively formu-
lated theoretical arguments for case law that would protect against
economic discrimination." Arguments were generally tied to a
traditional notion of equal protection requiring strict judicial scru-
tiny in the context of "suspect categories." With assistance from
Justices Marshal 110 5 and Douglas, 106 the theory emerged as a claim
that poverty was a suspect class.10 7
The cases holding poverty suspect gave general credence to the
theory that equal protection demanded a right to minimum basic
benefits. 0 8 But efforts to develop an extended theory tying poverty to
a wide range of fundamental benefits appeared to collapse with sub-
99. Id.
100. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
101. Id. at 629, 642.
102. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
103. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
104. In addition to the articles by Michelman, supra notes 12, 14 and 15, and the
book by Rawls, supra note 15, see, e.g., Redlich, Unconstitutional Conditions on Welfare
Eligibility, 1970 Wis. L. REV. 450; Reinstein, The Welfare Cases: Fundamental Rights,
the Poor, and the Burden of Proof in Constitutional Litigation, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1970);
LaFrance, Federal Litigation for the Poor, 1972 L. & Soc. ORDER 1; Graham, Poverty
and Substantive Due Process, 12 ARiz. L. REV. 2 (1970); Horowitz, Equal Protection
Aspects of Inequalities in Public Education and Public Assistance Programs from Place
to Place Within a State, 15 UCLA L. REV. 787 (1968); Comment, Equal Protection as
a Measure of Competing Interests in Welfare Litigation, 21 ME. L. REv. 175 (1969);
Comment, Discrimination against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 435 (1967); Comment, Evolution of Equal Protection - Education, Municipal
Services and Wealth, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105 (1972).
105. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 143 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
106. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
107. Id. at 668.
108. See Michelman, Supreme Court, supra note 12. Thus, just as the burden of
having to pay for a transcript in order to appeal a conviction discriminated against the
poor, arguments were made that denial of other minimum goods and services also was
discriminatory.
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sequent Supreme Court decisions. A death knell was heard by some
to sound in San Antonio v. Rodriguez.10 9 In that case, the Court
upheld a school financing scheme which offered more state aid per
pupil to some wealthy school districts than other poorer districts.
The decision effectively barred realistic equal opportunities for the
poor and appeared to have created a twentieth century counterpart
to Plessy v. Ferguson.110 Coupled with Dandridge, Jefferson and
subsequent cases like James v. Valtierra,'1 ' the Court put to rest
claims that poverty was a suspect class. Only in limited situations
where other rights with an arguable constitutional basis such as vot-
ing,"12 travel,113 criminal procedure,114 marriage 5 or divorce 116
were involved was there majority support within the Court for such a
theory.117
It should be noted that the primary cases ostensibly opposed to a
welfare rights thesis failed to reach the central element of the theory
that would limit that right to a minimum level of benefits.,, In Dan-
dridge, the Court faced a challenge to maximum benefits for large
families,119 and in Rodriguez, the Court explicitly noted: "Even if it
were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a con-
stitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise [of the
right to speech or vote], . . . we have no indication that the present
levels of educational expenditures in Texas provide an education that
109. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
110. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The analogy between Plessy v. Ferguson and San
Antonio v. Rodriguez is buttressed by the high percentage of minorities who are poor.
Thus, the poorer school district at issue in Rodriguez was 90% Mexican-American and
6% black; the wealthy district was over 80% white. 411 U.S. at 12-13. The Court's deci-
sion to ignore this reality sounds similar to the earlier pretense that separate could be
equal. For further discussion of the modern link between poverty and race, see W. WIL-
SON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE (1978).
111. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
112. Harper v. Virginia, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
113. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
114. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
115. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
116. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
117. Thus, by 1974, when indigents were forced to wait one year for free nonemer-
gency use of the county hospital, only Justice Douglas would have decided the case using
a "poverty is suspect" rationale. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 270
(1974). Only Justice Rehnquist dissented, however, from a decision that the restriction
violated the "right to travel," and Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court stressed the
significance of "basic necessities" to that analysis. Id. at 259.
118. See Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 12.
119. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 471.
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falls short. '1 20 The qualified nature of this statement supports the
general feeling that advocates of a right to welfare and the Supreme
Court are not moving along a common track.
The period after 1970 has been marked by repeated efforts to
identify an acceptable constitutional theory consistent with the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court. Commentators have attempted to mold
equal protection doctrine around the subject matter of cases that
triggered intensified scrutiny by the Court.'21 Originally, there were
two tiers of scrutiny. Discrimination based on race or alien status
required strict scrutiny;122 all other legislative classifications were
permissible if merely rational.123 As the Court began to grapple with
sex discrimination, an intermediate level of review emerged. 124 This
intermediate level of review represented a compromise between those
who would treat sex similar to race, as a suspect classification, and
those who rejected such a dramatic judicial move.12, Other subjects
also led to similar compromise - the Court has gone back and forth
in its review of legitimacy x2' and alien status classifications.127 A
120. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37.
121. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 77, at 590-600.
122. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
123. Even in earlier years there was some confusion about the definition of this
"rational basis" test. The most deferential review, common in recent decades, was first
described in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). See, e.g., the
statement from Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610 (1960). Between 1920 and 1934,
however, the Court applied a milder test requiring that the classification bear a "fair and
substantial relation" to the object of the law. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412 (1920). See J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT:
TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS, 1980-81, at 3-4 (1982) [hereinafter TRENDS AND DEVEL-
OPMENTS]. Recently the Court has moved back and forth between these formulations,
Compare the opinion by Justice Rehnquist in United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174 (1980) (citing Lindsley) with the opinion by Justice Brennan in
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (citing F.S. Royster Guano Co.).
124. Initially, the Court articulated a traditional rational basis test in reviewing
sex discrimination. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). "Suspect" terminology was used a
year and a half later in the plurality opinion of Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973). Since that time, the Court has given more sensitive review to sexual classifica-
tions than to traditional categories that fall short of "strict scrutiny." Although it has
been difficult to identify a consistent formulation of the test to be applied, at least four
members of the Court agree with the statement in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976),
that sexual classifications must be "substantially related to achievement of [important
governmental objectives]." Id. at 197. See TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 123,
at 19-40.
125. See TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 123.
126. The Court appeared to go back and forth in upholding legitimacy classifica-
tions in Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), and then striking down discrimination
against illegitimates in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). The
most recent decisions have used "rational basis" language while searching for a "sub-
stantial relationship to legitimate state interest." See, e.g., Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1
(1983).
127. Alienage traditionally has been identified as suspect. See Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). Recently, however, the Court has carved out a "public ser-
vice" exception permitting discrimination against aliens as teachers or as policemen. See,
e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1969) (teachers); Cabell v. Chavez-Sulide, 454
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similar ambivalence appears in Court descriptions of the status of
fundamental interest classifications. While classifications impairing
the right to travel' 28 or vote'2 9 are found to warrant special judicial
protection, the Court has used language of "rationality"' 130 to justify
its decisions. Those Justices who advocated explicit use of multi-
tiered or sliding scale analysis' 3' have been frustrated by the major-
ity which clings to the fiction that classifications are either suspect
- demanding compelling justifications - or not suspect, subject to
acceptance provided they are rational (with frequent shifts in the
meaning of "rational"). 3 2
The Court's refusal to identify consistently the principles that
guide its analysis has resulted in a particularly confused state of le-
gal theory. Most commentators agree that classifications based on
sex, legitimacy, alien status, or impinging upon voting, privacy, and
travel all generate arguments of principle that influence the Court's
equal protection analysis. 3 3 Those commentators, however, generally
have rejected claims that basic welfare benefits also trigger height-
ened judicial scrutiny.
34
Several cases are particularly troublesome to those who insist that
basic government benefits do not warrant special constitutional pro-
tection. A triad of 1973 decisions have been especially worthy of
comment. 3 5  In United States Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno,38 the Court used a rational relationship test to strike down
a food stamp exclusion of those in households with unrelated individ-
uals. In United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry,13 7 the
Court held that a food stamp program that excluded households con-
taining the tax dependent of another person created an impermissi-
U.S. 432 (1981) (policemen).
128. See Shapiro v. Thomson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
129. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
130. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (no "rational state interest"
served by distinction between citzens who established residence before or after 1959);
Mahon v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) (16.4% deviations in apportionment served a
"rational" state interest).
131. The most frequent advocate of flexible equal protection standards has been
Justice Marshall. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 519-21 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Powell also has leaned toward a more flexible approach as described in Schweiker v.
Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 239-40 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting).
132. See supra note 126.
133. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 77, at 682-816.
134. Id. at 680.
135. See Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 12, at 686.
136. 413 U.S. 528 (1974).
137. 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
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ble "irrebuttable presumption"1 38 that failed to meet constitutional
requirements of substantive due process. And in New Jersey Welfare
Rights Organization v. Cahill,1 39 the Court struck down a state stat-
utory denial of welfare benefits to families with illegitimate children.
Many commentators have been reluctant to deal with the Murry,
Moreno and Cahill cases. The opinions are described as aberrations
and mistakes '40 while some believe that at least Murry was overruled
by the Court's subsequent decision in Weinberger v. Salfi.141 The
cases remain flies in the ointment to theorists who agree that poverty
is not suspect and insist that welfare regulation is subject to the su-
perficial review of mere rationality standards.
Frank Michelman argues that the cases should be read as demon-
strations of the right to "needed means of subsistence. ' 142 The case
that would appear to place a capstone on Michelman's argument is
Plyler v. Doe.1 43 In that case the Court ruled that Texas could not
deny an elementary school education to aliens. The Court's holding
appeared inconsistent with traditional equal protection analysis re-
jecting special concern for education, and which would not have war-
ranted protection for illegal aliens. 4 In reaching its conclusion,
however, the Court frankly acknowledged the substantive impor-
tance of assuring minimum educational benefits: "We cannot ignore
the significant social costs borne by our nation when select groups
are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our
social order rests.' 148 Given the implications of a complete denial of
education rights to a "discrete class of children not accountable for
their disabling status, ' 146 the Court held that the state restriction
could "hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some substan-
tial goal of the state. '14
7
Use of the term "rational" persisted in Lyng v. Castillo148 where
the Court upheld treatment of close family relatives who lived to-
gether as a household unit (therefore reducing their total food stamp
eligibility) regardless of whether they cooked and ate as a group.
The Court distinguished Moreno by stressing the irrational nature of
138. Id. at 514.
139. 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
140. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 77, at 683. The authors conclude: "these
two decisions [United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno and United States Dep't of
Agric. v. Murry] stand out as atypical findings that a law fails to meet the rationality
test."
141. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
142. See Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 12, at 691.
143. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
144. Id. at 223.
145. Id. at 221.
146. Id. at 223.
147. Id. at 224.
148. 106 S. Ct. 2727 (1986).
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the classification in that case. 49 Two other factors specifically noted
by the Court, however, breathe life into an appeal for judicial pro-
tection. First, Justice Stevens acknowledged that the classification in
Lyng only resulted in a proportionate reduction in benefits rather
than the ineligibility for benefits which was at issue in Moreno. 50
Consistent judicial concern for minimum benefits therefore survives.
Second, in this case, Congress was dealing with a traditional nuclear
family that had not been afforded the same treatment as unrelated
individuals residing together, just the reverse of Moreno. Because
the traditional family is generally accorded political respect, judicial
protection is less important.' 5' The Court's review of these factors in
Lyng, plus the obvious concerns for administrative resources and pre-
vention of fraud which had motivated Congress in that case, is con-
sistent with arguments that denial of basic benefits should trigger
more careful review. The language in all of these cases, however,
falls short of establishing a right to receive minimum state benefits
adequate to meet demands for subsistence.' 52
The Appeal to "Neutral Principles"
The central problem with extending constitutional protection to
victims of unfair welfare distribution schemes is the concern that
judges should not substitute their personal policy preferences for
those of the legislature. The "realistic" argument that such a judicial
role was appropriate (and perhaps even inevitable) was rejected by
the legal positivists who focused on the legitimacy of legislative acts.
By insisting upon adherence to the language of properly enacted law,
positivists focused attention on the value of due process. This appeal
to the democratic process was part of a broader effort to identify
149. Id. at 2730.
150. Id. at 2730 n.3.
151. Id. at 2729.
152. Several members of the Court went out of their way to stress those limits in
Plyler. Justice Brennan stated: "Public education is not a 'right' granted to individuals
by the Constitution." 457 U.S. at 221. Justice Blackmun stated: "it is undeniable that
education is not a 'fundamental right' in the sense that it is constitutionally guaranteed."
Id. at 235. Justice Powell stated: "I emphasize the Court's conclusion that strict scrutiny
...has been reserved for instances in which a 'fundamental' constitutional right or a'suspect' classification is present. Neither is present in [this case]." Id. at 238 n.2. But
note that all four of the justices writing opinions with the majority (Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun and Powell) recognize special status in the context of the complete loss of an
elementary education. Justice Blackmun notes that "classifications involving the com-
plete denial of education are in a sense unique, for they strike at the heart of equal
protection values by involving the State in the creation of permanent class distinctions."
Id. at 234.
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neutral principles as guides for the judiciary.153 John Hart Ely, for
instance, would inject procedural values'" into the open-textured
clauses of the fourteenth amendment. He claims that such values
have a stronger constitutional basis and a superior claim to neutral-
ity than a more open-ended appeal to principles. 5" Ely, however,
also recognizes that some substantive values may be implicated by
the principle of democracy and may therefore be incorporated
through the same door. While the values he identified relate to
speech, publication and political association,"'5 there is no inherent
reason why the line should be drawn at that point and not extended
to education, health or minimum welfare assistance. If the goal is
equal participation in the political process, surely minimum health
and welfare are essential factors in meeting that goal.
Ely also recognizes the need to safeguard minorities while other-
wise deferring to majoritorian principles,1 57 but he does not offer
convincing "neutral" guides to determine which minorities warrant
protection. In other words, the neutrality Ely advocates only works
when certain assumptions are shared: 58 voting and free speech are
essential to full participation in the democratic process while educa-
tion, health and minimum resources are not.'5 Racism is vile; dis-
crimination against the poor is not.
Gerald Gunther offered an alternative "neutral" approach to
equal protection analysis which was also intended to counter haphaz-
ard substitution of judge-made policy preferences with his descrip-
tion of "intensified means scrutiny." 1 0 Gunther's theory was that
the Court had added teeth to a traditional concept of mere rational-
ity. It did so without challenging the aims or goals of the legislation
or referring to the particular persons affected. Instead, it focused on
the means employed by the legislative classification to meet the leg-
islative purposes.' 61 The appeal of Gunther's theory was that it
avoided problems of judicial review of the substance of legislative
decisions. A comparison of means with purposes could be made in all
153. See Weehsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constititional Law, 73 HARV L.
REv. 1 (1959).
154. J. ELY, supra note 12, at 11-41.
155. Id. at 73-104.
156. Id. at 105.
157. Id. at 135-79.
158. See Brest, supra note 32. Dworkin makes an additional attack on the line Ely
draws between process and substance in R. DWORKIN. PRINCIPLE, supra note 34, at 58-
69.
159. In his text, Ely does not address the question of whether minimum standards
of health or welfare are a prerequisite to participation in the political process. J. ELY,
supra note 12.
160. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV L.
REv. 1 (1972).
161. Id. at 20-24.
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cases regardless of the subject matter of the legislation, therefore
downplaying claims that the judiciary was substituting its substan-
tive values for those of the legislature.1 62 If Gunther's theory had
proven accurate, it would not have been logical to argue for a sepa-
rate legal principle requiring fair distribution of basic welfare bene-
fits. But the Supreme Court has not jumped onto Gunther's band-
wagon. Equal protection opinions of the Court continue to vary both
in style and substance, at times engaging in substantial review and at
other times returning to "mere rationality" language. 6 These varia-
tions belie arguments for neutral principles.
Gunther anticipated this inconsistency when he acknowledged use
of an intensified rational basis review to avoid more troublesome con-
stitutional issues.164 Thus, when debts of indigent criminal defend-
ants were singled out for discrimination, the Court failed to find"some rationality" and thereby avoided having to face the deeper
implications of Gideon v. Wainwright. 65 The Court again used an
intensified rational basis test to avoid dealing with the constitutional
parameters of detention for the mentally ill.166 The fact that a ra-
tional basis test is given bite when fundamental interests lurk be-
hind, but is not given the same strength in all other contexts, sug-
gests a substantive aspect of the constitutional scrutiny that goes
beyond evaluation of legislative means. Although Gunther's theory
continues to receive support,167 the products of judicial review re-
main inconsistent with any purely "neutral" analysis.
The Myth of "Rights"
On the other end of the spectrum from neutral procedural values
is the claim that principles guiding constitutional analysis should re-
flect "rights in the strong sense." 16 8 Recognition of "rights" has the
same underlying appeal as the call for "neutral" process-oriented
values. Both ostensibly offer bright lines to guide the judiciary that
are above the fray of personal policy preferences.
Application of rights terminology to create review of welfare clas-
162. Id. at 21.
163. See supra note 128.
164. Gunther, supra note 160, at 26-29.
165. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See also Gunther, supra note 160, at 26, for his discus-
sion of James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
166. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). See Gunther, supra note 160, at 27.
167. See Leedes, The Rationality Requirement of the Equal Protection Clause,
42 OHIO ST. L.J. 639 (1981).
168. See R. DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 190.
1139
sifications creates conflicts which stem in part from the language of
rights. The term itself is symbolic of the liberal dreams and frustra-
tions so prevalent in the 1960s and 70s. The "politics of rights"' "
were destined to conflict with the purity of acceptable judicial the-
ory. The judiciary is anxious to preserve the "virtue of reality"170
and therefore avoid a declaration of rights that will not be realized.
Gaps in this nation's commitment to minimum welfare are too great
to support judicial declaration of a right so shrouded by myth."'
The language of rights has lost some of its luster for liberals as
well as for conservatives.17 The civil rights movement of the 1960s
failed to establish the great society. Expectations raised by the con-
cept of rights were frustrated by the reality of limited success and
frequent failure.
Part of the lesson was that rights conflict. The bright lines drawn
around rights did not solve the problem of having the judiciary bal-
ance competing claims against each other. Discrimination could be
rooted out only through new forms of discrimination.17 3 Privacy
could only be assured through limitations on other freedoms. 4 As-
sumptions of public responsibility often conflict with personal lib-
erty.173 And the harshness of the conservative crusade rests on the
nagging reality that resources are limited and bureaucratic solutions
leave much to be desired. An appeal to rights to receive benefits in
the context of this bureaucratic maze, especially in an era of man-
dated government budget cuts, will fall on deaf ears in the Supreme
Court.
Despite perceived shortcomings in an appeal to rights, there con-
tinues to be support for a legal principle that welfare benefits should
be distributed fairly. Procedural protection for brutal needs remains
vital.176 Similar substantive principles can be derived from the equal
169. See S. SHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS (1974).
170. Id. at 46-49.
171. See id. for a discussion of the importance of preserving the "myth of rights."
172. See Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L.
REv. 1431 (1986) (analysis of the conservative influence of "liberal" welfare rights based
on a conception of the "new property").
173. See, e.g., the conflict between affirmative action and "seniority rights" in Wy-
gant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
174. The privacy of welfare records, for instance, necessitates limits on public ac-
cess to government records.
175. See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); King v. Smith, 392 U.S.
309 (1968). Public welfare assistance for children generally has been accompanied by
state involvement in parental decisions.
176. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text. This is true despite the fact
that in the general pretrial context where private property is at issue the Court appears
to have developed a formula which does not vary with the type of property involved
(assuming that the party seizing the property can claim an apparent right to possession).
See e.g., North Georgia Finishing Co. v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
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protection/substantive due process opinions of the Court. 7 Failures
in the distributional structure of this country, and existing holes in
the welfare safety net,178 however, cannot be corrected by the consti-
tutional principles recognized by the Court.
In an ideal new constitutional convention that demands equal con-
cern for all segments of society, a right to minimum protection
against economic hazard might be given a more fundamental consti-
tutional role.17 9 Our historical roots in the struggle for representation
and economic freedom, however, give prominence to those "demo-
cratic" values rather than to the social welfare values that have
emerged in many Western European nations.' Because of this dif-
ference in emphasis, neither judges nor scholars are likely to con-
clude that there is a fundamental right to receive welfare benefits in
this country. There is a gap between rights associated with the ideal
theory of John Rawls' 8' and the constraints (both real and
imagined) faced by the current Supreme Court. As a result, "princi-
pled" recognition of "protection for recipients" is more likely to gain
credence if separated from traditional rights terminology.
Intermediate Principles
An alternative approach begins with the premise that not all prin-
ciples affecting constitutional decision-making reflect "rights in the
strong sense."'182 Although some constitutional rights, such as the
177. See supra note 12. Both Michelman and Tribe have advanced this argument.
178. See supra note 64. Gaping holes are especially apparent in comparing state
provisions for monetary assistance, medical aid and shelter to two-parent families and
able-bodied but unemployable adults in many states.
179. See J. RAWLS, supra note 15.
180. See R. DWORKIN. PRINCIPLE, supra note 34, at 26. Note also the contrast
between the Court's ostensible "mere rationality" review of welfare classifications and
the United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. G.A. Res.
220 (Dec. 16, 1966), reprinted in E. OSMAlfICZYK. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED
NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 359-61 (1985), which provides in Article 9
for a "right of everyone to Social Security," and in Article I I for a right to "adequate
food, clothing and housing."
181. See Michelman, Pursuit, supra note 15, at 997-1003. Michelman expressly
deals with this issue in his discussions of "nonideal theory." He subsequently examines
questions of "moral theory as a backdrop for positive entitlements," id. at 1010-15, and
in that context defines a role for the moral theory of Rawls similar to that described in
this article: "Perhaps a theory like Rawls' can impart meaning and direction to judicial
events occurring in the wake of constitutional or legislative initiatives that arise, so far as
the theory is concerned, quite spontaneously." Id. at 1010. My concern, however, stems
from his description of a proposed "judicial activism" which exceeds obvious predilection
of the Court, and with a theory which at one point he describes as "justice-inspired
welfare rights . . . guaranteed to everyone regardless of need." Id. at 1012.
182. R. DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 190.
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right to free speech, cannot be abrogated by a simple balance of in-
dividual versus societal interests, those rights in the strong sense do
not exhaust the range of possibilities. They represent the easy cases.
The hard work begins with an identification of intermediate princi-
ples - principles that can be outweighed by something less than a
compelling state interest, but are nevertheless entitled to considera-
tion in the constitutional context.
Some may argue that intermediate principles have no place in
constitutional analysis. 183 Fourteenth amendment analysis, for in-
stance, could be limited to strong rights by narrowing its scope to: 1)
fundamental interests (those mentioned in the first eight amend-
ments, voting, travel, and privacy); 2) protection of discrete and in-
sular minorities; and 3) freedom from arbitrary discrimination. All
of these principles could be expressed in forceful terms and the pu-
rity of strong constitutional rights could be protected.
That "purity," however, is as deceptive as it is superficially attrac-
tive. Thus, the starkness of the traditional two-tiered strict scrutiny/
minimal review standard stands in particularly ironic contrast to the
concept of equal protection. Few classifications are more arbitrary
than those adopted by the Supreme Court itself in finding that the
right to travel is fundamental,184 while denial of subsistence can be
justified by mere rationality.185 In reality, even the Justices acknowl-
edge that they make substantive distinctions that contradict their
simplistic two-tiered approach.188 Arguable suspect categories other
than race, as well as fundamental interests such as voting, travel or
privacy (and now education?), have been recognized on the basis of
intermediate principles rather than as rights in the strong sense.187 .
The need to weigh the principles involved is demonstrated by the
Court's treatment of other equal protection problems. Judicial scru-
tiny of reapportionment decisions demonstrates this need. The Court
has held that congressional districts buttressed by article II as well
as equal protection concerns must be divided within a state to near
mathematical precision, 88 while state legislative districts are granted
183. Dworkin comes close to arguing that all constitutional rights must be rights in
the strong sense: "[I]n the United States citzens are supposed to have certain fundamen-
tal rights against their Government, certain moral rights made into legal rights by the
Constitution. If this idea is significant, and worth bringing about, then these rights must
be rights in the strong sense." Id. at 190. He subsequently acknowledges, however, that
not all constitutional analysis has this character. Id. at 191.
184. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
185. See Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577 (1976). Note again that denial of basic
necessities intensifies the right to travel analysis.
186. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 77, at 532, 533.
187. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
188. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973) (striking reapportionment where maxi-
mum deviation from the ideal was 2.43%).
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far greater latitude.189 In other words, the principle of one person -
one vote has relatively less weight in the state context: it has been
understood as an intermediate principle, not as a right in the strong
sense.
In a more current context, it is not necessary to treat discrimina-
tion based on race in the same fashion when a majority has enacted
affirmative action laws as it was treated when the hostility of the
majority was represented by the "separate but equal" doctrine. 190
Legislative efforts to remedy past discrimination therefore should not
be subject to the same constraints as those applied to policies and
practices of racism.'
At the same time, it may be more important for the Court to be
sensitive to discrimination against the poor if it can be shown that
the current political majority is insensitive toward their concerns.
This need for judicial protection is heightened if it also can be shown
that hostility towards the poor substitutes for overt racial discrimina-
tion of the past. Are current leaders, who refuse to recognize dis-
crimination against sectors within the poverty community (while
fully conscious of the disproportionate racial impact that results),
any better than those leaders who institutionalized racism after the
Civil War by accepting "separate but equal" standards?"92
The opinions of the Court in Plyler came as close as any to ac-
knowledging acceptance of intermediate principles in equal protec-
tion analysis. Justice Marshall repeated his plea for "rejecting a ri-
gidified approach to equal protection analysis, and of employing an
approach that allows for varying levels of scrutiny depending upon
'the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely
affected and the recognized invidiousness upon which the particular
189. Mahon v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) (upholding deviations of up to
16.4%). See also Davis v. Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. 2797 (1986).
190. It should be readily acknowledged that "separate but equal" was a fiction
created by the courts. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The fundamental
problem that makes it so difficult for courts to safeguard minorities who are the object of
the hostility of an existing majority is that judicial officers are likely either to share the
hostility, or at least to be reluctant to act in a manner that is contrary to conventional
morality. For arguments on both sides of this issue compare the opinions of Justices
White and Blackmun in Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
191. The Supreme Court is divided on this issue as demonstrated by the opinions
in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
192. See, e.g., analysis of the factual background in Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 959; Jef-
ferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. at 551 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Just as in Plessy, inevitably
the implication of those decisions is inferior treatment for a large segment of the minor-
ity community.
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classification is drawn.' ,193 As Justice Brennan wrote for the Court
in Plyler:
We have recognized that certain forms of legislative classification, while not
facially invidious, nonetheless give rise to recurring constitutional difficul-
ties; in these limited circumstances we have sought the assurance that the
classification reflects a reasoned judgment consistent with the ideal of equal
protection by inquiring whether it may fairly be viewed as furthering a sub-
stantial interest in the state.
19
4
Justice Powell compared review of legitimacy classifications and
noted: "In these unique circumstances, the Court properly may re-
quire that the State's interests be substantial and that the means
bear a 'fair and substantial relation' to these interests."', Justice
Blackmun concurred, stating "[o]nly a pedant would insist that there
are no meaningful distinctions among the multitude of social and
political interests regulated by the States."' 96
The Justices' frustration in finding "meaningful distinctions"
stems in part from problems in articulating principles other than the
classic fundamental interests.1 97 In making this argument, it is im-
portant to distinguish between "strong rights" and "enduring princi-
ples." The Court and commentators have expressed concern that
principles which influence constitutional decision making should not
be fleeting or merely reflect temporary concerns of the public. 98
Widespread agreement that such a principle is deeply rooted does
not raise it to the status of a strong right - thereby precluding ac-
ceptance of a theory of intermediate principles. An important and
enduring principle nevertheless can be one that is entitled to less
than full deference and that can be countered by substantial rather
than compelling state interests.
Once the role of intermediate principles in equal protection analy-
sis is accepted, it is possible to consider protection from denial of
fundamental goods and services as such a principle. As an intermedi-
ate principle it is entitled to substantial weight, but is not a trump in
the strong sense of more traditional individual constitutional
193. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 231 (Marshall, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 217-18.
195. Id. at 239 (Powell, J., concurring).
196. Id. at 233 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
197. Note that in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985),
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, stressed the need to articu-
late "the facts and principles that justify subjecting this zoning ordinance to ... height-
ened scrutiny." 105 S. Ct. at 3263.
198. In Plyler, Justice Brennan cites Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 430
U.S. 265 (1978): "In expounding the Constitution, the Court's role is to discern 'princi-
ples sufficiently absolute to give them roots throughout the community and continuity
over significant periods of time, and to lift them above the level of the pragmatic political
judgments of a particular time and place." 457 U.S. at 218 n.16 (quoting A. Cox. THE
ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 114 (1976)).
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rights.""9 One would not have to argue that a compelling state inter-
est was required to justify failure to provide equal treatment for all
applicants for assistance. Legislative policy interests - arguments
that societal interests should be balanced in the equation - would
be appropriate (though not decisive). Substantial social policy argu-
ments could outweigh the principle of equality in the distribution of
benefits. By definition there would be more deference paid to legisla-
tive policy choices than found in the traditional context of more
heavily weighted constitutional rights. 00 Such decisions are hard
precisely because they necessitate difficult assessments. The fact that
the analysis is difficult, forcing both the Court and Congress to use
scalpels when an axe is easier, is an inadequate justification for abdi-
cating responsibility.
FAIR DISTRIBUTION AND BRUTAL NEEDS
Two themes can be identified from the opinions of the Supreme
Court that overturned legislative classifications even though no sus-
pect catagories or fundamental interests were involved. One is an
emphasis on the need for fairness, 201 and the second is the special
concern in the context of brutal needs.20 2 This emphasis is consistent
with the concern for moral values described at the outset of this pa-
199. This intermediate principle may warrant substantially greater weight in the
interpretation of state constitutional law than it is given in an analysis of the federal
constitution. In most instances the principle of equality is built into the state constitu-
tions in much the same way that it appears in the federal constitution. Often, however, it
is accompanied by substantive state constitutional obligations to provide for the basic
education, health or general well-being of the population. Even in the absence of such
formal constitutional constraint, most states have a deeply rooted historical obligation to
meet the needs of the poor. A legal principle that demands fundamental fairness in ef-
forts to meet brutal needs may as a result be described as a right in the strong sense
when analyzed as a part of the state constitutional law.
200. See generally J. CHOPER. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS 129 (1980). There are a number of reasons why this intermediate approach is
appropriate in the public benefits context. As identified in this Article, one problem is the
constraint of precedent and the attitude that currently limits the Court. Lack of explicit
constitutional reference and limitations in the historical treatment of such claims are
appropriate factors to be considered in weighing these principles. Furthermore, unlike
rights to free speech or the free exercise of religion, welfare rights require resource trans-
fers that interact in a complex fashion with regulation of the national economy. Legisla-
tive flexibility is important in that context and the legislature must therefore be given
freer reign. Related to these constraints are realistic limits on the Court's remedial pow-
ers, particularly where a strong right to social insurance would require major change
through legislative action.
201. See supra note 47.
202. Id.
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per.203 Immanuel Kant, John Rawls and Frank Michelman all would
recognize its origins.2 04
The principle I have described, however, is not based on an as-
sumed right to primary social goods for the least advantaged. 0 A
Supreme Court interpretation in those terms might be vulnerable to
the historical criticism of Justice Holmes for having embodied "a
particular economic theory"206 in the Constitution. The intermediate
principle that stresses fair distribution rests on a different basis that
can be reconciled more easily with Justice Holmes' dissent in Loch-
ner v. New York.20 7 The key difference is that the emphasis on fair-
ness rests on an assumption that the legislature already has made the
decision to distribute the goods or services in question. The Court
has never ordered the distribution of benefits not already the subject
of a broad legislative mandate. When the Court overturned classifi-
cations bearing on the distribution of food stamps 08 or general assis-
tance20 9 or an elementary school education,210 its orders were consis-
tent with the underlying purpose of existing legislative programs.211
Thus, a Supreme Court majority apparently agrees that education is
not a fundamental right.2 12 Nevertheless, once a state has "under-
taken to provide an education to most children within its borders
. . . the State must offer something more than a rational basis for its
classification."213
203. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 15-16.
205. Id.
206. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). There are historical roots
for development of a need-based conception of rights. See Simon, supra note 172. While
I think it is unlikely that such a conception of rights would be adopted in the forsecable
future, I would expect the principles defined in this section to aid in development of a
need-focused jurisprudence. Thus, I have relied upon equal protection rather than due
process concepts in order to emphasize redistribution to those most prejudiced by current
welfare law. In keeping with Professor Simon's analysis, I have proposed a framework
intended to complement recent feminist literature and the "welfare jurisprudence of the
New Deal social workers." Simon, supra note 172, at 1485.
207. See generally id. I do not mean to overemphasize the significance of Justice
Holmes' dissent. The principal error of Lochner was not its use of economic theory, but
rather its implied incorporation of a theory "which a large part of the country does not
entertain," id., and which is inconsistent with the modern role of the Court (see supra
note 29 and accompanying text). The Lochner majority would have barred states from
effectively addressing problems of social welfare, and that narrow conception of state
power remains unacceptable. Their error should not condemn all legitimate use of eco-
nomic, political or moral theory. Such theory, however, is most effectively applied when
derived from the existing body of law. See supra text accompanying notes 35-39.
208. United States Dep't. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); United States
Dep't. of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
209. New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
210. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
211. See, e.g., id., at 234 (Justice Blackmun stressed the state's decision that "pro-
vides an education to some and denies it to others.").
212. See J. ELY, supra note 12, at 11-41.
213. Plyler v. Due, 457 U.S. at 235 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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This symbiotic relationship between the Court and the legisla-
ture2 14 represents an important majoritarian constraint. It also re-
lieves initial problems inherent in defining basic needs.2 15 There is no
reason to fear judicial imposition of innovative social insurance, since
the principle itself depends on identification of a general legislative
mandate. The Court would not be assuming an inappropriate activist
role; rather, it would be in a familiar posture of protecting unpopular
minorities from being left out of protective legislation or from be-
coming targets of legislative retreats. 16
The focus on fair distribution also should be distinguished from a
broad claim that poverty is a suspect class. Because, as indicated
above, there is an existing legislative effort to meet the needs of at
least some of the poor, it generally should be understood that unfair
classifications do not stem from hostility toward all of the poor. Hi-
erarchical treatment of groups of poor people,211 however, coupled
with crude distinctions among those politically impotent groups,218
warrants judicial protection for those excluded. 1 9
An emphasis on fairness parallels treatment given to other consti-
tutional problems that have been addressed on an intermediate level.
In analyzing rules of state apportionment, for instance, a generalized
concern for fairness is a more accurate description of the judicial
standard than a strict demand for equality.2 0 In a similar sense, du-
rational residency requirements are reviewed in terms of a search for"reasonable" justifications. 2 1
214. See Michelman, Pursuit, supra note 15. He also noted this relationship.
215. A basic element of the early criticism directed at Michelman's article advo-
cating use of the equal protection clause to secure a right to basic goods and services
focused on the "elitism" involved in any decision where "minimum needs" were to be
designated. See Winter, supra note 47. This problem is, of course, not eliminated by the
emphasis on preexisting legislative mandates; the Court must still decide which legisla-
tion triggers its increased scrutiny. The Court still will need to identify "brutal needs"
for this purpose. Id. at 52.
216. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1974); New
Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
217. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 36 & 37. It should not matter whether
the crude distinctions result from hostility or indifference.
219. See Lyng v. Castillo, 106 S. Ct. 2727 (1986). Note again the absence of
"historical hostility" towards the nuclear family which the Court cited in support of its
decision. Members of the Court, thus, continue to recognize the relevance of this
distinction.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 193-94.
221. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975). Other efforts have been made
to define the context in which durational residency requirements apply. Justice Marshall
discussed these issues for the majority of the Court in Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). As he noted there, many durational residency require-
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Of course, it is important to acknowledge that concerns for fair
apportionment or reasonable residency requirements are tied to iden-
tifiable protected interests. In order to distinguish welfare legislation
from all other social and economic regulations, I am proposing that
this fair distribution formula should be used only when recipients are
faced with a brutal need. While this phrase is derived from judicial
treatment of due process standards, it is also an apt description of
the lines drawn by the Court to protect those excluded from basic
goods and services.
The legitimacy of this focus on need depends on the level of gener-
ality at which it functions. Members of the Court have suggested
extreme alternatives. At one end of the spectrum, Justice Stevens
and Chief Justice Burger have advocated a single rational basis stan-
dard to replace the tiered analysis of equal protection claims.22 This
"unbridled" rational basis test, however, is seen as too general and
risks movelnent "back toward the days of Lochner v. New York."
2 23
At the other extreme, some have argued that prior cases must be
very narrowly restricted to their facts.2 The decision to protect the
interest of illegal alien children in an elementary school education
could be, for example, seen as nothing more than an education case.
Justice Powell, however, specifically noted his more general concern:
"If the resident children of illegal aliens were denied welfare assis-
tance, made available by government to all other children who qual-
ify, this also - in my opinion - would be an impermissible penaliz-
ing of children because of their parent's status.1225 The combination
of equal protection and due process cases previously reviewed sug-
gests an underlying concern for those faced with a denial of mini-
mum essential goods and services. As a result, that is the appropriate
level of generality for the operative principle I am seeking.
A principle of fair distribution defined in these terms is consistent
with the dominant jurisprudence of this century. 2 It represents a
pragmatic adaptation of the principle of equal protection to the "new
property" of the welfare state, and it does so in a manner that is
consistent with the underlying democratic goals of the legislature. It
ments impinge to some extent on the right to travel .. " Id. at 256. The level of judi-
cial scrutiny varies depending upon the interest affected by the residency requirement. In
that case, access to a county hospital was an interest in "a basic necessity of life" that
triggered use of a "compelling state interest test." Id. at 257-259.
222. These two justices most recently joined in this argument in Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). They would argue, for instance, that ra-
cial discrimination is almost always irrational because racial classifications generally lack
any valid basis.
223. Id. at 455-78 (Marshall, J., concurring).
224. See, e.g., the reasoning of Justice White in Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 432. Com-
pare this with Justice Marshall's approach. 473 U.S. at 456.
225. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 239 n.3.
226. See R. SUMMERS, supra note 21.
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is also consistent with the philosophy that judicial protection should
be exercised most actively on behalf of those not adequately pro-
tected by the majoritarian democratic process.22
The change in judicial philosophy that accompanied judicial ac-
ceptance of the New Deal228 resolved the basic question of economic
control.229 In footnote four of the Carolene Products decision230 Jus-
tice Stone acknowledged that general sphere of legislative authority.
He went on to identify those factors, including protection of the po-
litical process and "discrete and insular minorities," which narrowed
the "scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality." '231
Those who argue that government goods and services designed to
meet basic minimum needs are "merely some governmental 'benefit'
indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation "232
are showing deference to legislative control of the economy. Those
who argue for strong welfare rights or that poverty is a suspect
class 233 are making assumptions derived from the activist side of
footnote four. Denial of basic welfare is unique because it involves
elements of both; as a result, an intermediate principle is needed.
Arguments for accepting an intermediate principle protecting
claims to welfare benefits are based on the premise that the Court
should identify those legal principles entitled to weight and affecting
the outcome of its opinions. The Court continues to be influenced by
the significance, in human terms, of the substantive claims affected
by state action and reviewed under the fourteenth amendment. The
Justices are appropriately moved by the brutal need of those unfairly
denied fundamental assistance. In a coherent theory of constitutional
decision making, factors that motivate court restrictions on legisla-
tive action should be identified in principled terms if they are to be
perceived as legitimate. 34
The historical tendency to dance around the issue of welfare rights
can be understood as an example of Professor Gunther's "avoidance"
concept.2 35 The Court is not prepared to enter the deep and murky
227. See supra text accompanying note 29.
228. The "switch in time that saved nine" was made by Justice Owen Roberts in
the case of" West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
229. See R. MCCLOSKEY. THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 177 (1960).
230. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
231. Id.
232. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (Brennan, J., concurring). Words to this effect appear
frequently in the Supreme Court's opinions.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 107-11.
234. See R. DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 87-88.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 162-67.
1149
waters of welfare rights, and there are substantial reasons for per-
mitting greater legislative freedom in the welfare context than is tol-
erated when rights involving free speech, religious liberty, or racial
equality are infringed. Principled expressions of legitimate concern
for those unfairly denied essential goods or services, however, have
been avoided through an ostensibly traditional search for rational-
ity.236 Avoidance or abandonment of identifiable principles undercuts
the Supreme Court's guiding role. The victims are those classes of
potential welfare recipients who do not receive adequate protection
from the legislative, administrative or lower judicial branches be-
cause of a lack of clear guidance from the Supreme Court. It is for
their benefit that this issue should be called "from the battleground
of power politics to the forum of principle.
237
This principle of fair distribution to meet brutal needs should be
distinguished from the argument that this society would benefit from
an expanded welfare system. General arguments about whether or
not welfare programs should be adopted or expanded may be ad-
vanced because of the social or economic results that would follow.
Those arguments, however, boil down to evaluations of legislative
policy and should be left in the hands of the legislature. The distinc-
tive character of a principled argument is that it functions as an
enduring part of the constitutional framework and applies indepen-
dently of judgments about social policy.
This distinction does not mean that policy considerations can be
ignored by the courts. On the contrary, an intermediate principle
like the one I have described is most likely to be defeated by the
social or economic policy judgments advanced by the state. Advo-
cates challenging the legislative classification, however, could not
rely on their own visions of how to promote the general public wel-
fare, and would be restricted to arguments based on principle. The
judicial role would be confined to a determination of whether the
legislative policy interests outweigh that principle. The weight to be
236. See supra note 167. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens both have sug-
gested in recent decisions that all equal protection analysis should be seen as nothing
more than a search for rationality. It is interesting to note that the same two Justices
also would avoid difficult problems of statutory construction on the theory that
"[w]henever a constitutional question is arguably presented, legislative intent should be
interpreted so as to avoid reaching that constitutional issue." NLRB v. Catholic Bishop
of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979 (Burger, C.J., concurring); United States v. Locke, 471
U.S. 84 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
237. R. DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 34, at 71. Professor Dworkin's argu-
ment: "We do better to work openly and willingly so that the national argument of prin-
ciple that judicial review provides is better argument for our part. We have an institution
that calls some issues from the battleground of power politics to the forum of principle. It
holds out the promise that the deepest, most fundamental conflicts between individual
and society will once, some place, finally become questions of justice. I do not call that
religion or prophecy. I call it law." Id.
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given to this principle138 would become more clear through its appli-
cation over time. The essential first step, however, is to acknowledge
that the principle exists.
We have left the early, tentative days of Flemming23 9 when the
Court struggled in obvious discomfort to come to grips with the new
property of the welfare state. Safeguarding the distribution of aid to
the poor is not of vital political interest to the majority,240 and that is
one reason why judicial protection is appropriate. This appeal to
principle is not intended to invoke visions of evolving standards of
higher morality. The welfare state is not necessarily morally supe-
rior; it is, however, a fact of modern life. And for those no longer
able to "Go West" to meet their basic needs, new standards of pro-
tection are necessary.
Supreme Court Justices cannot perform their roles by limiting
constitutional status to those values most meaningful to their own
privileged backgrounds.2 4' The function of the Court should include
protection of values which naturally arise as part of the current rela-
tionship between citizens and their government. Reliance on private
charity ended in the seventeenth century with the Elizabethan Poor
Laws.242 Belief that income followed moral superiority should have
ended with the Victorian era. 43 The present challenge is not one of
forging new rights through a renewed spirit of judicial activism. It is
rather an appeal to identify constitutional principles consistent with
the era in which we live.
238. See R. DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 34.
239. 363 U.S. 603 (1960); see supra text accompanying notes 90-96.
240. That becomes increasingly significant as the poor become an increasingly dis-
tinct minority within society.
241. There continues to be a risk that judicial review would become a form of rule
by aristocracy. See R. DAHL, DEMOCRACV IN THE UNITED STATES 493 (1977). As noted
by Ely, "the list of values the Court and the commentators have tended to enshrine as
fundamental is a list with which the readers of this book will have little trouble identify-
ing: expression, association, personal autonomy, even the right not to be locked in a stere-
otypically female sex role and supported by one's husband. But watch most fundamental-
rights theorists start edging toward the door when someone mentions jobs, food, or hous-
ing. Those are important, sure, but they aren't fundamental." J. ELY, supra note 12, at
59 (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37 (Marshall, T., dissenting); Dandridge, 397 U.S. at
508; Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 144
(1976); Tushnet, ". .And Only Wealth Will Buy You Justice" Some Notes on the
Supreme Court. 1972 Term, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 177, 190.
242. See Riesenfeld, supra note 52.
243. See Woodard, supra note 48.
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CONCLUSION
Theoretical alternatives are needed to resolve the conflict between
welfare rights and mere rationality standards of fourteenth amend-
ment analysis. Arguments for a right to receive welfare benefits are
compelling in a political context. They are unlikely, however, to re-
ceive majority support from the current Supreme Court. Mere ra-
tionality standards (and neutral principle alternatives), however, are
inconsistent with the appropriate concern shown by the Court when
denial of monetary assistance, food or elementary education occurs
in the context of recipients with recognized brutal needs.
Hiding these issues under a guise of neutrality or rationality alters
the character of the public debate which follows. Identification of
substantive legal principles which motivate Court action must pre-
cede valid and coherent fourteenth amendment analysis. In keeping
with the legal theory that has guided the judiciary through most of
this century, the Court should recognize explicitly an intermediate
principle that basic government goods and services must be distrib-
uted fairly to those in need.
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